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With the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the agreement on the constitution of the
European Central Bank the interest in the demand for money has focused on a new question:
what are the properties of a demand function for a European monetary aggregate? This issue
is especially interesting for the future monetary authorities in the proposed European Mone-
tary Union.
So far, a number of studies have investigated aggregated money demand functions for dif-
ferent groups of European countries.
1  These studies vary with respect to the estimation
method, the monetary aggregate, and the sample period under consideration.  Nevertheless,
most conclude that a European money demand function possesses good economic and statisti-
cal properties and is more stable than most national functions.
Targeting a monetary aggregate has many advantages compared to other target variables for
monetary policy.  The Deutsche Bundesbank has had a positive experience with monetary tar-
geting for over 20 years.  Since the European Central Bank resembles the Bundesbank in its
constitution and its instruments, it will presumably adopt the Bundesbank’s strategy for
monetary policy.  In addition, monetary targets are easily verified by the public and will en-
hance the credibility of the European Central Bank that cannot rely on a reputation for price
stability, like the Bundesbank, immediately after the transition to European Monetary Union.
Nevertheless, it is premature to advocate a particular monetary policy with a European
monetary aggregate as intermediate target and the results for a European money demand
function should be viewed with caution.  Concerning the transition to monetary union, it is
especially interesting to know what causes the superior performance of a European function.
If it is due to currency substitution, a quick move to a monetary union would be advisable be-
cause increasing currency substitution would make monetary policy on the national level un-
feasible.  If, on the other hand, a stable European function is attained by a similar structure of
money demand in the European countries there is no need to establish a monetary union.  The
European Monetary Union, though, could solve the problems of asymmetry in monetary pol-
icy formulation.  Today, the Deutsche Bundesbank sets monetary policy according to domestic
objectives and the other countries follow by fixing their exchange rate with Germany.
To reach a conclusion on these points, national and European functions that are estimated
with the same data and methodology should be compared.  Up to now, most studies estimate
                                               
1 See e.g., Kremers and Lane (1990), Monticelli and Strauss-Kahn (1991), Artis, Bladen-Hovell, and Zhang
(1993).3
The first differences of Xt are stationary since the variables are I(1).  If the variables in Xt are
cointegrated, a stationary linear combination PXt-k of the elements in Xt exists.  In this case,
the regression is balanced, meaning that the order of integration on the left hand side of the
system corresponds to the order of integration on the right hand side.
Two different groups of European countries are considered.  The first group constitutes the
smallest conceivable monetary union, comprising Germany, France, and the Netherlands.
Germany and France are the driving forces in the European Unification process so that a
monetary union without them is not imaginable. The Netherlands are a likely candidate for
monetary union due to their geographic position and their close economic relations with Ger-
many as well as with France.  The second group includes four major European countries:
Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.  These countries accounted for nearly 80%
of GDP in the European Union in 1994 and are chosen because quarterly income data are
available over the whole sample period.  Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these will be the
countries entering into a monetary union in 1999.  In the last year, none of them met the con-
vergence criteria.  Today, Italy with its extremely high government debt almost surely will fail
to reach the required debt to GDP ratio of 60%.  The United Kingdom has negotiated an opt-
ing out clause in the Maastricht Treaty, which makes her participation in the monetary union
doubtful.  On the other hand, from a political point of view a monetary union will be formed
only if a sufficient number of countries are ready to participate.  So the four major countries -
as a proxy for the whole EU - may give an appropriate impression of money demand in a
European Monetary Union.
The real money stock is defined as logarithm of M3H, deflated by the consumer price index.
Income is the logarithm of real GDP.  M3H denotes a harmonized definition of money, estab-
lished by the Committee of Central Bank Governors, and includes comparable components in
all countries.  It relates to bank’s liabilities with resident non-money-creating institutions and
covers notes and coins, demand deposits, foreign currency deposits, and short term financial
instruments, irrespective of their issuer. Since M3H comprises also time and savings deposits,
the inclusion of an own interest rate and an interest rate on alternative investment opportuni-
ties seems appropriate.  Including two interest rates, however, has consequences for the coin-
tegrating relationships.  Consider a system containing the four variables real money, real in-
come, a long and a short interest rate: X = (m, y, r
L, r
S).  If the spread between the interest
rates is stationary, two cointegrating vectors are obtained: one for money demand and one for4
the term structure of the interest rates.  Without identifying restrictions, any linear combination
of the cointegrating vectors is again a solution.  To identify both cointegration vectors, at least
one restriction on each vector has to be imposed.  For the cointegrating vector representing
the interest rate spread there is an overidentifying restriction: neither money nor income should
enter.  Moreover, if the expectations theory of the term structure holds, the coefficients on the
interest rates should be equal with opposite signs.
4  For the money demand vector economic
theory gives no plausible restrictions implying that only the sum of the interest rate elasticities
is identified.  If it is assumed that the expectations theory of the term structure holds, one in-
terest rate can be excluded in the estimation and the sum of the long and short interest rate
elasticity is obtained on the remaining interest rate coefficient.
5  This manipulation does not
change the income or the interest rate elasticity because the regression always gives the sum of
both interest rate elasticities, independently from the rate excluded. The interest rate used here
is the government bond yield.
All data are quarterly and the model includes four centered seasonal dummies.  The sample
starts in the first quarter of 1973 because at that time the Bretton Woods System collapsed
while the European countries tried to establish exchange rate stability with the „snake“.  The
sample end is dictated by data availability and falls on the last quarter of 1994.
6
2
Empirical Results
First, money demand on the national level is investigated.
7  Before specifying the model, it is
obligatory to investigate the time series properties of the variables.  The unit root tests include
two lags for the interest rate since they show no seasonal pattern, and four lags for the other
variables.  For most time series the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test indicates that the time se-
                                               
4 See e.g., Campbell and Shiller (1987) for an empirical test of this hypothesis.
5 See Hoffman and Rasche (1996), Hoffman, Rasche, and Tieslau (1995).
6 Real GDP for Germany includes the new Länder from 1990:3 on and is from the Sachverständigenrat’s
annual report.  Data on M3H were obtained from the national central banks.  All other data are from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics on CD-ROM.  To get a common sample length for all countries,
missing values for M3H have been taken from the broad monetary aggregate on IFS CD-ROM.  This is for
Italy before 1975:1 and for France before 1977:4.  Since in the 1970’s financial innovation and holdings of
foreign currencies were insignificant, the differences between the harmonized and the IFS definition of
broad money are negligible.  For the Netherlands, GDP before 1986 was interpolated with data on industrial
production.
7 The estimation is performed with CATS in RATS.5
ries are integrated of order one, I(1).
8  The exceptions are real money in Italy and the British
interest rate being trend stationary.  However, in the case of Italy the result is not robust and
changes if the number of lag is varied. Trend stationarity for an interest rate, however, makes
theoretically no sense, as the rate of interest would have to rise by a fixed amount in all future
periods. As for the British interest rate trend stationarity is caused by the constant rise of the
government bond yield during the particular sample period, the variable is treated as a random
walk.  For France, the United Kindom, and the Netherlands the first differences of real money
turn out to be non-stationary but this result changes if the Phillips-Perron test is used.
9
Therefore, these variables are treated as I(1), too.
2.1
Results for National Money Demand
The Johansen procedure is based upon an unrestricted vector autoregressive model, and esti-
mation and testing are contingent on the specification of the VAR.  Before the model is esti-
mated, a choice on the order of the VAR has to be made.  For the determination of the lag
order the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is used.  The specifications considered for the
VECM range from one to four lags.
10  For Germany and France, the AIC indicates the inclu-
sion of two lags in the VECM, that is k = 3 in eq. (2).  For the other countries, the VAR is
estimated with a single lag.  In the German equation a dummy variable for German Unifica-
tion, taking the value of one in the third quarter of 1990, is included.  The dummy enters only
the short-run relation, assuming that the long-run money demand is not affected by the mone-
tary union.
11
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
First, the residuals are investigated to check if the model is correctly specified.  Table 1
shows univariate and multivariate statistics for the residuals.  Generally, the models seem to be
well specified.  For Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands the multivariate Shenton-
                                               
8 In testing for a unit root the procedure suggested by Dolado, Jenkinson, and Sosvilla-Rivero (1990) is fol-
lowed.
9 The nonparametric test by Phillips and Perron performs better than the Dickey-Fuller-Test if a positively
correlated moving average process is considered (Phillips and Perron, 1988).
10 More than four lags were not considered because of the loss in degrees of freedom due to the estimation of
too many parameters.
11 Unfortunately, almost any type of dummy variable changes the asymptotic distribution of the rank tests and
the standard tables will not apply.  As the results for German money demand do not differ markedly from
the results for the other countries and from those of other studies, the effect of the German dummy on the
asymptotic distribution seems to be negligible, and new tables were not computed.6
Bowman test rejects the normality of the residuals.  Including more lags does not solve this
problem, so the specification with k = 2 is retained.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Table 2 presents the test statistics for the determination of the cointegration rank.  Except
for Italy, where no cointegrating vector is found at conventional levels of significance, for each
country a single long-run relationship exists between money, income, and the interest rate.
12
Table 3 shows the estimates for the long-run parameters, normalized with respect to real
money, and the adjustment coefficients for the money demand equation.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
The estimates for the long run relation are quite similar across the countries and are in line
with the results of other investigations.
13  For Germany, France, and the Netherlands the in-
come elasticity exceeds unity, whereas for the United Kingdom the income elasticity of 0.3 is
quite low.
 14.  Except for Italy, the interest rate elasticity is negative, and the error correction
term is significant. Nevertheless, it is low in absolute value, implying an adjustment towards
equilibrium of only about 5 % per quarter.
2.2
Aggregate Specification
Next, an aggregate European money demand function is estimated.  Though macroeconomic
relationships are derived from assumptions about individual behavior and thus always imply
aggregation over different individuals and different goods, little attention is paid to the theo-
retical justification for and the consequences of aggregation.
The first problem is the aggregation over different individuals.  For a demand function to be
independent of the distribution of explanatory variables over individual agents, one has to as-
sume that all agents react identically to a change in these variables, that is, that a representa-
tive consumer exists.
15  Otherwise, a stable demand function exists only if the distribution of
the explanatory variables remains constant over time.  Valid aggregation thus requires a priori
                                               
12 Though for Italy no stable long-run relationship could be found, the first eigenvector ís reported albeit it is
not significant at the 90% level.
13 See, e.g., the survey by Fase (1994).
14 The results for the United Kindom and the Netherlands have to be regarded with some caution because
normality of the residuals was rejected and the trace and the lmax statistic may be biased.
15 The assumption implies that all consumers allocate increases in income identically over their portfolios of
monetary assets.  In other words, preferences have to be quasihomothetic, leading to linear and parallel
Engel-curves, see Gorman (1953) or Deaton and Muellbauer (1989).7
knowledge of the distribution of the explanatory variables across the micro units.  Neither as-
sumption is appealing and generally fulfilled in practical applications.
Aggregation over commodities also involves special assumptions that are highly restrictive
and unlikely to hold in practice.  Simple summation of different goods is only valid if the
goods are identical, that is, if they are perfect substitutes for the representative consumer.  In
other words, different commodities can be treated as one good only if the relative price be-
tween these commodities remains constant.
16  Though different national moneys may be close
substitutes with respect to their store of value function, they do not substitute each other as a
medium of transaction.  French francs, for example, perform transaction services in France,
but not in Germany or in Italy.  Without a monetary union simple-sum aggregates of different
national moneys have to be regarded with caution.
2.3
What Level of Aggregation?
Unfortunately, a satisfactory resolution of the aggregation problem is generally impossible.
While the theoretical assumptions for consistent aggregation are rather strong, aggregation is
inevitable in empirical applications.  In applied econometrics therefore the issue is not whether
consistent aggregation is possible, but rather at what level of aggregation or disaggregation
the analysis should be carried out.  Since national money demand functions consider already
aggregate relationships the question arises if further aggregation is justified.  Criteria for the
choice of the aggregation level are the purpose of the estimation, the error structure, and the
availability and quality of the data (Barker and Pesaran 1990).
2.3.1
Purpose of the Estimation
With the transition to European Monetary Union, monetary policy will be formulated for the
whole currency area.  For this purpose a function predicting money demand in Europe is
needed.  Aggregation is recommended if an aggregated function leads to better forecasts of
the area-wide money demand than the disaggregated functions.  Generally, it does not appear
possible to deduce whether or not it is better to use aggregated data if the aggregate behavior
is to be predicted.
17
                                               
16 The condition is known as Hick’s composite commodity theorem.
17 See Edwards and Orcutt (1969).  The same result applies for the existence of cointegrating relationships.  It
cannot be concluded that if a cointegrating relationship was found with the disaggregated equations, cointe-8
Theil (1954) showed that the variance of the residuals of the aggregate equation must be
always larger than the variance of the sum of the disaggregate residuals because aggregation
results in a loss of information if the disaggregate relations are not identical.  Thus, no advan-
tage is to be expected from estimating and forecasting with an aggregate money demand func-
tion.  The conclusion, however, rests on Theil’s assumptions that the disaggregate equations
are perfectly specified.  This assumption generally will be violated in empirical applications, so
that the aggregate equation may lead to better forecasts.  This is especially true if, with inte-
grated financial markets, national money demand becomes increasingly influenced by financial
developments in other countries.  While a correctly specified money demand equation will
have to include foreign variables, it is impossible to consider all relevant foreign variables in
the estimation.  Aggregation is one potential solution to this problem.  While aggregation in-
duces an aggregation bias because the parameter estimates are constrained to the same value
across countries, the specification bias caused by the exclusion of foreign variables in the na-
tional equations may decrease and it is not clear which bias is more disturbing.
2.3.2
Error Structure
If money demand shocks across Europe are negatively correlated, an aggregated money de-
mand function will lead to better estimates than the national functions.  A negative correlation
of money demand shocks will result if currency substitution is the main cause for national
money demand instability.  Targeting a European monetary aggregate may lead to greater sta-
bility if currency substitution destabilizes the national money demand functions but leaves a
European aggregate unaffected.
2.3.4
Data
Though for many empirical investigations data are not available on a disaggregated level, all
data exist on a national basis here.  Nevertheless, two problems remain.  The first one is the
consistent definition of a European monetary aggregate, the second one the choice of an ap-
propriate exchange rate for the conversion of national variables into a common currency.
Money holdings can be classified according to three different criteria (see Goodhart 1990).
These criteria are the currency of denomination, the residence of the holder, and the location
                                                                                                                                                 
gration is also to be found on the aggregated level.  It is possible to have cointegration at the aggregate level
without having cointegration at the disaggregate level, and vice versa (Granger 1990).9
of the bank.  Most countries define money as deposits held by residents with local banks.  If
national monetary aggregates in their current definition are added together, this leads to omis-
sion of money holdings that should be counted to European money.  A consistent definition of
a European monetary aggregate should include the deposits held by residents from one Euro-
pean country with banks in another member country of the European Union.  Community-
wide consistency of national monetary aggregates is achieved if all countries refer to the same
definition, based on one of the three criteria, which take account of cross-border monetary
holdings.  Currently, the national definitions do not meet this requirement.  The problem also
arises with M3H because it relates to the two criteria of the residence of the holder and the
location of the bank, irrespective of the currency of denomination.
Nevertheless, cross-border deposits are not included here and the European aggregate is
defined as the sum of the national definitions of M3H.  Though cross-border deposits will
certainly become more important in the future, their significance for money demand in the past
was limited.  Monticelli and Papi (1996) found that a European aggregate consisting of M3 in
its traditional definition has a closer relation to output and interest rates than a monetary ag-
gregate including cross-border deposits.  It can be assumed that cross-border deposits are
mainly held as savings instruments and do not perform transaction functions for their holders
(Giucca and Levy 1992).  Moreover, the data on cross-border deposits are of poor quality.
18
The second question concerning the computation of aggregate variables is the choice of an
exchange rate.  There are almost no theoretical arguments for the conversion of national vari-
ables into a common currency, though the choice of the exchange rate influences the behavior
of the aggregated variables considerably.  Three different conversion methods can be chosen:
current exchange rates, a fixed base year exchange rate or purchasing power parities.
Proponents of current exchange rates argue that anyone wanting to convert money balances
from one currency into another has to change his money at the market exchange rate.  Using
market exchange rates, expenditures converted into a common currency also reflect the differ-
ences in the price levels between the countries, not simply differences in real income.  If money
and income are both converted with current exchange rates, the exchange rate enters the left
and the right hand sides of the regression, artificially increasing the correlation between the
                                               
18 The definition of money according to the localization of the bank is statistically the easiest to pursue, but
makes economically not much sense because holdings in financial centers, such as the United Kingdom,
tend to weaken the relation between money and output.  On the other hand, a splitting between resident’s
and non-resident’s holdings is difficult to estimate accurately, see Goodhart (1990).10
dependent and the independent variable.  Moreover, devaluations are often high and can easily
dominate the growth of the real variables, causing an atypical behavior of the aggregates.
Alternatively, money and income could be converted with base year exchange rates, which
correspond to the market relation at a fixed date.  Base year and market exchange rates can
deviate considerably since devaluations have been frequent in the European Monetary System.
The longer the sample period, the less a base year rate will correspond to market relations.
Apart from avoiding the artificial correlation introduced with current exchange rates, there
seem to be no arguments in favor of base year exchange rates.
A third possibility is the transformation with purchasing power parities.  Purchasing power
parities are the rates of currency conversion that equalize the purchasing power of different
currencies and eliminate the differences in price levels between countries.  When real income
for different countries is converted into a common currency by means of purchasing power
parities, it is expressed at the same set of international prices so that comparisons between
countries reflect only differences in the volume of goods and services purchased.
19  To avoid a
double deflation, real magnitudes are converted with the purchasing power parity of a base
year.  Thus, no correlation between independent and dependent variables is introduced
through the use of purchasing power parities.
20
In the literature, different choices have been made with regard to the exchange rate.
Kremers and Lane (1990) use purchasing power parities, while Monticelli and Strauss-Kahn
(1991) advocate current exchange rates.  As no clear case can be made for either of the con-
version methods on theoretical grounds, aggregates are constructed using all three proce-
dures.
21
                                               
19 In economic theory purchasing power parities often appear as equilibrium exchange rates to which the ac-
tual exchange rates are assumed to converge.  The purchasing power parities calculated by the OECD serve
for the comparison of  international prices and volume of GDP.  They are not relevant as equilibrium ex-
change rates.
20 While current and base year exchange rates correspond to actual market outcomes, the calculation of pur-
chasing power parities poses some problems.  The estimated purchasing power parities depend on the base
year and the commodity basket chosen.  Moreover, there is no method to compute purchasing power parities
that satisfy a set of desirable properties, see Gulde and Schulze-Ghattas (1992).
21 Funke (1995) argues that each of the three conversion methods above introduces a bias into the aggregates.
The growth rate of an unbiased aggregate should equal the average growth rates of the national variables.
Bayoumi and Kenen (1993) compute a weighted average of growth rates for the analysis of a European
monetary aggregate.  This approach is not  used here because for the investigation of long-run relationships
the levels of the time series are needed, not only the first differences.11
2.4
Results for European Money Demand
The aggregated variables show the same characteristics as the aggregates derived by Kremers
and Lane (1990) and Funke (1995).  Variables converted into Deutsche Mark with the pur-
chasing power parities of the year 1990 (see OECD 1990) are indexed by P.  The index B in-
dicates conversion with base year rates and E with current exchange rates.
22
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Figure 1 shows aggregate real money for the four European countries.  The downward
movement of aggregate real money based on current nominal exchange rates reflects the
nominal appreciation of the Deutsche Mark relative to the other European currencies.  The
aggregation at base-period exchange rates produces a pattern similar to that resulting from
aggregation at purchasing power parities.  The difference in the levels of the series results
from the different weighting pattern introduced by the exchange rate.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2 shows aggregate real income.  If income is aggregated with current exchange rates,
movements in the exchange rates dominate real growth so that a rather atypical picture
emerges.  Interest rates are aggregated with the three different real GDP weights correspond-
ing to each of the three conversion methods and, as Figure 3 shows, are less sensitive to the
aggregation method chosen.
23
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
For the aggregate variables the unit root tests indicate that most time series are I(1).  Ex-
ceptions are real money for EG 3, converted with purchasing power parities and with base
year exchange rates where the Augemented Dickey Fuller Test indicates that the first differ-
ences are non-stationary.  With the Phillips Perron Test, however, they turn out to be station-
ary so that these variables are also treated as I(1).  In testing for the lag length, the Akaike
information criterion suggests k = 3 for the system EG 3 (B) and k = 2 for the other systems.
Table 4 gives univariate and multivariate statistics for the residuals.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
                                               
22 For the aggregates constructed with base year and current exchange rates, nominal money and nominal
income are added and then deflated with an aggregated consumer price index and an aggregated GDP de-
flator, respectively. The aggregated price indices are weighted averages of national price indices, the
weights being the country’s share in aggregated real GDP.
23 The aggregates for the three countries Germany, France, and the Netherlands show the same characteristics.12
In general, the specification of the models seems satisfactory.  With regard to autocorrela-
tion and normality, the systems for the EG 3 aggregates perform better. The test statistics for
the EG 4 countries did not improve considerably when more lags were included.  As Falk and
Funke (1995) found that the German Monetary Union had an impact on the European demand
for money, a dummy was included in all estimations.  Table 5 lists the test statistics for the
determination of the cointegration rank.  For each aggregate system a single cointegrating
vector is found.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Table 6 shows the parameter estimates and the error correction coefficients.  In general, the
coefficients are economically plausible and quite similar across the different country groups.
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
For the EG 3 (P) system and the EG 3 (B) system the income elasticity is close to one and
the intrest rate elasticity is negative.  For the EG 3 (E) system, converted with current ex-
change rates, the income elasticity is considerably higher and the interest rate elasticity has the
wrong sign.  The results for the EG 4 (P) system and the EG 4 (B) system are similar, though
the income elasticity is slightly higher than in the EG 3 estimations.  For the EG 4 (E) system
the income elasticity is even negative, a result that is not in line with economic theory.  This
implausible result is possibly caused by the strong depreciation of the Italian Lira and the Brit-
ish Pound relative to the DM during the sample period.  Except for the EG 3 (E) system, the
error correction terms are significantly negative and of the same magnitude as in the national
estimations.
3
Testing for Aggregation Errors
Next, the relation between the money demand equations on the national and the European
level is investigated.  In testing for aggregation errors two different strands are pursued in the
literature (see Lee, Pesaran, and Pierse 1990).  First, one can check whether aggregation re-
sults in biased parameter estimates.  Second, one can compare the predictive performance and
the forecasting behavior of the aggregate and disaggregate functions.13
3.1
Coefficient Equality
Theil (1954) shows that equality of parameters across the disaggregated equations is a suffi-
cient condition for absence of an aggregation bias.
 24  However, he assumed that the Klein-
Nataf consistency requirement holds, meaning that the aggregated variables are defined as the
sum of the disaggregated variables.  In our case, the disaggregated equations are specified in a
semi-logarithmic form.  To meet the Klein-Nataf consistency requirement, aggregated money
and income would have to be defined as the sum of the variables in logarithms instead as the
logarithm of the sum of the variables.  Otherwise, the specification for the aggregate equation
would be implausible from an economic point of view.  In effect, different model specifications
are compared, not only the performance of an aggregate versus a disaggregate equation sys-
tem.
25  Table 7 presents the results of likelihood ratio tests for the equality of the long-run
coefficients of the disaggregate and the aggregate equation.
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
Only for EG 3 (B) equality of the parameters for the aggregate and the national functions is
not rejected on the 5 % level of significance.  For all other systems equality is rejected.  Espe-
cially for the United Kingdom the coefficients of the national function differ considerably from
those of the aggregate function.  It seems therefore that money demand in Europe is not simi-
lar enough to justify aggregation.
3.2
Predictive Performance
The predictive accuracy of the aggregated money demand function is crucial for monetary
targeting.  Grunfeld and Griliches (1960) propose a criterion to compare the aggregate and
disaggregate equations based on their predictive performance.  The idea is to evaluate if
money demand on the aggregate level can better be explained by an aggregate equation or by
the disaggregated equations taken together.  The Grunfeld-Griliches criterion thus is con-
cerned with the power of explanation obtained by the regression rather than with the errors in
estimating the true economic coefficients.  It relies on the comparison of the coefficients of
                                               
24 The equality of the parameters across the disaggrated equations is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition,
see Pesaran, Pierse, and Kumar (1989).  Different parameter estimates do not lead to an aggregation bias, if
the explanatory variables remain in the same proportion to each other.
25 Wesche (1996) performs simulations to investigate this issue. For the parameter values which are in general
encountered in money demand estimation, testing equality of the parameter estimates seems to be a reason-
able approximation also with logarithmic aggregation as the aggregation bias is insubstantial in this case.14
determination of the aggregate and disaggregate regressions, though they cannot be compared
directly because they are relative measures of fit.
26  Grunfeld and Griliches therefore construct
a “composite” R
2 that is compared to the ordinary R
2 from the aggregate equation.  The com-
posite R
2 is defined as the percentage of the total variance of aggregate real money that is ex-
plained by the variation in the sum of fitted money demand from the national disaggregate
regressions.
R
S
S
c
c
m
2
2
2 1 = - (3)
S
2
c denotes the variance of the sum of residuals of the individual regressions and S
2
m the vari-
ance of aggregate real money.  A comparison of the composite R
2 to the R
2 of the aggregate
regression answers the question whether one obtains more information about aggregate money
demand by computing regressions for the single countries than by simply taking a regression of
aggregate money on the aggregate income and interest rates.
The problem of the logarithmic specification for the aggregate and the disaggregate equa-
tions arises also here.  For the money and the income equation, the antilogs of the residuals are
taken, added together, and then transformed into logarithms again.  As interest rates are non-
logarithmic, the residuals from the interest rate equations are simply added together.
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
Results are shown in Table 8.  The first three columns show the composite R
2, the next
three columns show the R
2 of the aggregate regressions.  For EG 3 (P) and EG 3 (B) the ag-
gregate systems perform better for the money demand equations and the interest rate equa-
tions. In all other cases the national systems perform better.  Thus, the Grunfeld-Griliches cri-
terion indicates that the disaggregate equations work better than the aggregate specification.
This is even more discouraging as the micro equations and the macro equations apply the same
specification.  Generally, an advantage for specifying equations on the disaggregated level is
the possibility to differentiate between the micro units (see Barker and Pesaran 1990).
27
Nevertheless, in most cases the difference between the explanatory value of the aggregate and
the disaggregate systems is small.  To investigate the significance of this difference, an F-test
ist performed. In estimating an aggregate equation, all parameters are restricted to the same
                                               
26 For the R
2 of the national regressions the variance of national real money stands in the denominator while
for the aggregate R
2 the variance of aggregate real money is in the denominator.
27 If one takes the residual cross-correlation of national money demand into account, the predicitive perform-
ance of the disaggregate regressions could still be improved compared to the aggregate regression.15
value whereas in national estimations the coefficients are allowed to differ between countries.
The F-statistic is defined as
F
RSS URSS m
URSS T l
=
-
-
( ) /
/ ( )
. (4)
RSS is the sum of squared residuals in the restricted estimation, URSS the sum of unrestricted
squared residuals,
28 m is the number of restrictions, T the number of observations, and l the
number of estimated parameters.
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
Table 9 shows the results.  Only for the systems converted with current exchange rates, the
aggregate equations explain money demand significantly worse. For the other systems, the
differences in the explanatory vaulue are insignificant.
Edwards and Orcutt (1969) argue that aggregate and disaggregate equations should not be
compared with respect to their explanatory value but to their forecasting performance as the
R² bears no relation to the forecasting performance of an equation.  This means that regres-
sions with a lower R
2 may forecast better and vice versa.
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE
Table 10 compares mean squared forecast errors for the aggregate and the disaggregate
equations for the last eight quarters of the sample period.  For the systems converted with
current exchange rate, the national equations obviously perform better.  Surprisingly, for the
EG 4 (P) and EG 4 (B) aggregates the aggregate forcast error is lower.  Thus, the forecast
errors show no clear picture in favor of the national or the European equations.
3.3
Currency Substitution
A standard argument to explain the superior performance of a European money demand func-
tion is currency substitution.  The currency substitution hypothesis implies that people change
from one currency into another in reaction to expected changes in the exchange rates or other
factors, which are difficult to measure.  If currency substitution is present, the residuals of the
money demand equations should be negatively correlated because the model does not include
foreign variables.
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE
                                               
28 With respect to the problem of logarithmic aggregation, the same approach as for the Grunfeld-Griliches
Test is followed.16
Table 10 shows the cross-correlation coefficients for the residuals of the national money
demand equations.  The results do not support the currency substitution hypothesis.  Only
between Italy and Germany there is a significant negative residual cross-correlation.  All other
correlations are either insignificant or even positive.  This is in line with the results of Ange-
loni, Cottarelli, and Levy (1994) and Lane and Poloz (1992) who find only weak correlation of
money demand errors across the European countries.  A study by the Deutsche Bundesbank
(1995) also finds no significant effects of currency substitution on German money demand
with respect to the European currencies, except for Italy.  Currency substitution thus seems
not to be the cause for the stability of a European money demand function.
4
Conclusion
The paper investigates the stability and the predictive performance of a European money de-
mand function.  Two different groups of countries were considered, corresponding to a
“small” and a “large” monetary union.  The aggregate money demand function for the core
countries Germany, France, and the Netherlands performs better than the money demand
function for the four largest European countries Germany, France, Italy, and the United King-
dom.
As there are no theoretical arguments for the choice of a particular exchange rate, three
conversion methods are used.  Conversion of real magnitudes with purchasing power parities
and conversion with base year exchange rates leads to similar results but the results for the
aggregate money demand function sobtained with current exchange rates differ considerably
and the parameter estimates are economically implausible.  This result indicates that exchange
rates are not yet stable enough to lead to a meaningful European money demand function.
Without exchange rate stability, a precondition for a meaningful definition of a European
monetary aggregate is lacking.  After the transition to European Monetary Union, however,
this problem disappears as exchange rates will cease to exist.
Currency substitution does not seem to be the major cause for the stability of a European
function.  The correlation of the residuals of the national money demand functions is weak,
thus suggesting that currency substitution is of minor importance.  Instead, the stability of the
European function apparently relies on the structural similarity of the national money demand
equations, at least for Germany, France, and the Netherlands.  Therefore, the European Cen-17
tral Bank should only follow a strategy of monetary targeting, if a small and stability-
orientated group of countries is to join.18
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Tables and Figures
Table 1. Residuals for the national money demand systems.
Germany
k = 3
France
k = 3
Italy
k = 2
United Kingdom
k = 2
Netherlands
k = 2
L-B 184.335 153.009 214.218 240.570 170.261
LM (1) 3.644 5.779 5.713 8.904 9.137
LM (4) 14.966 11.074 24.136 15.050 8.451
NV 8.364 7.841 60.677 36.896 26.346
ARCH NORM ARCH NORM ARCH NORM ARCH NORM ARCH NORM
M3HR 0.78 2.48 3.71 0.41 0.24 19.17 2.63 12.23 2.59 3.69
GDPR 1.81 6.02 0.70 5.03 2.17 4.21 10.97 30.79 1.60 17.07
GBY 12.11 0.79 5.40 3.04 0.69 41.70 1.55 1.22 0.64 3.04
Notes:
M3HR is real broad money, GDPR real gross domestic product and GBY is the government bond yield, k is the
order of the VECM.  The upper panel shows multivariate statistics for the system as a whole, the lower panel
univariate statistics considering each equation separately.  Ljung-Box is a test for residual autocorrelation of
the first 20 lags, distributed as c²(162) for Germany and France, and as c²(171) for Italy, the UK, and the
Netherlands.  The critical values for the 5 % level are 192.70 and 202.51. LM(1) and LM(4) are Lagrange
multiplier tests for first and fourth order autocorrelation.  They are distributed as c²(9), the critical value for
the 5% level is 16.92.  Normality is the multivariate version of the Shenton-Bowman test, NORM is the
univariate Shenton-Bowman test for normality of the residuals (see Hansen and Juselius, 1995).  The
multivariate test is distributed as c²(6), the critical value for the 5% level is 12.59.  The univariate test is distri-
buted as c²(2) with a critical value of 5.99.  ARCH is a test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity of
order k based on the Lagrange multiplier principle and is distributed as c²(k).
Table 2. Test for Cointegration.
H0 Germany France Italy United Kingdom Netherlands
lmax Trace lmax Trace lmax Trace lmax Trace lmax Trace
r £ 0 23.40 32.57 12.27 23.62 10.38 15.14 27.40 36.01 18.00 27.74
r £ 1 8.73 9.17 10.91 11.35 3.63 4.76 8.47 8.61 9.00 9.74
r £ 2 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.43 1.13 1.13 0.14 0.14 0.73 0.73
Notes:
Critical values for the 90 % significance level are 13.39 (r £ 0), 10.60 (r £ 1), and 2.71 (r £ 2) for the lmax
statistic and 26.70 (r £ 0), 13.31 (r £ 1), and 2.71 (r £ 2) for the trace statistic.  In the German equation system
a dummy, taking the value of one in 1990:3, is included.  The constant is unrestricted.
Table 3. Long-Run Estimates and Error Correction Parameters.24
The null-hypothesis is that the income and interest rate elasticity of the respective national money demand
function are equal to that of the European money demand function.  The test-statistic is distributed as c
2(2), the
critical value for the 5 % level of significance is 5.99.
Table 8. Grunfeld-Griliches Test.
composite R² aggregate R²
EG 3 (P) EG 3 (B) EG 3 (E) EG 3 (P) EG 3 (B) EG 3 (E)
M3HR 0.899 0.898 0.915 0.903 0.904 0.681
GDPR 0.885 0.892 0.904 0.853 0.867 0.698
GBY 0.323 0.322 0.332 0.324 0.356 0.278
EG 4 (P) EG 4 (B) EG 4 (E) EG 4 (P) EG 4 (B) EG 4 (E)
M3HR 0.870 0.866 0.927 0.854 0.860 0.446
GDPR 0.823 0.842 0.944 0.823 0.783 0.353
GBY 0.408 0.413 0.442 0.371 0.389 0.345
Notes:
For money and income a logarithmic transformation of the residuals is applied.
Table 9. F-Test.
 (P)
EG 3
(B)  (E) (P)
EG 4
(B) (E)
M3HR -0.081 -0.188 5.523 0.240 0.097 13.159
GDRP 0.559 0.676 4.284 0.590 0.750 21.125
GBY -0.004 -0.150 0.162 0.125 0.079 0.347
DGF (26,75) (23,71) (26,75) (36,75) (36,75) (36,75)
Notes:
DGF shows the degrees of freedom for the test in the respective column. All critical values for the 5 % level of
significance are below 1.67.
Table 10. One step ahead mean squared forecast errors.
composite forecast error aggregate forecast error
EG 3 (P) EG 3 (B) EG 3 (E) EG 3 (P) EG 3 (B) EG 3 (E)
M3HR 0.685 0.907 0.712 0.768 0.544 0.855
GDPR 0.115 0.114 0.127 0.135 0.151 0.111
GBY 0.192 0.193 0.194 0.205 0.181 0.239
Total 0.992 1.214 1.033 1.108 0.876 1.205
EG 4 (P) EG 4 (B) EG 4 (E) EG 4 (P) EG 4 (B) EG 4 (E)
M3HR 0.339 0.437 0.334 0.277 0.291 1.205
GDPR 0.046 0.050 0.085 0.046 0.049 0.743
GBY 0.239 0.234 0.230 0.209 0.192 0.268
Total 0.624 0.721 0.649 0.532 0.532 2.216
Notes:
The forecast errors are normalized with the variance of the respective variable in the forecasting period 1992:1
to 1994:4. The last line gives the forecast error for the whole system.25
Table 11. Residual Correlation.
frest irest urest nrest
drest 0.033
(0.308)
-0.267
(-2.459)
0.288
(2.659)
0.250
(2.304)
frest 0.125
(1.151)
0.115
(1.058)
-0.066
(-0.609)
irest -0.181
(-1.680)
-0.118
(-1.097)
urest 0.165
(1.526)
Notes:
The table shows the correlation coefficients between the residuals from the money demand equations.
The t-values in parenthesis are the ratio of the correlation coefficient to the inverse of the square root
of the sample size.26
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